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Analytical Procedure Results as Substantive
Evidence*
William R. Kinney, Jr.
Christine M. Haynes
University of Texas at Austin
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) allow two basic types of
evidence to satisfy the third standard of fieldwork. These are analytical procedure results and tests of details of transactions and balances. GAAS is
clear that the third standard can be met with any combination of the two that
the auditor deems to be appropriate and GAAS makes no qualitative or "competency" distinction between them. Yet, analytical procedure results are routinely subject to several biases not present in tests of details. In this paper
we clarify conceptual differences that may lead to an overassessment of the
competency or validity of evidence provided by analytical procedures.
Clarification of the biases inherent in analytical procedures is important
given the increased emphasis on analytical procedures in professional standards (e.g., SAS No. 39, 47, and 56 and SAARS No. 1), and its increased use
in practice [Tabor and Willis, 1985]. Auditors may be substituting inferior evidence for tests of details with an attendant increase in achieved audit risk.
Below we review the history of analytical procedures and their regulation,
analyze the essential features and risks of analytical procedures, and demonstrate several sources of bias in their use as substantive evidence. Finally,
we provide some suggestions for research on analytical procedures and a suggestion for a change in standards.

1. History of Analytical Procedures in Auditing
Essentially, analytical procedure results as substantive evidence are evaluations of the reasonableness of the assumption of no material misstatement
in aggregate recorded amounts, given the auditor's other knowledge. Analytical procedures do not encompass examination of details supporting the
validity of particular items comprising a recorded population. Thus, the substantive validity of any item or group of items is not determined directly.
The origin of analytical procedure results as substantive evidence is unclear. Stringer and Stewart [1986, p. 15] cite a Deloitte Haskins & Sells audit
*We acknowledge the helpful comments of Urton Anderson, Sarah Bonner, Vicky Heiman, Lisa
Koonce, Linda McDaniel and Garry Marchant, and we wish to thank Larry Logan of Deloitte &
Touche for providing a technical document.
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manual describing the use of analytical procedures in the 1930s and they had
reason to believe that the manual merely codified existing practices. Deloitte
& Touche provided us with a copy of Bulletin 302-1 from the 1939 edition of
DH&S Technical Procedures Manual. It is reproduced in Figure 1. The Bulletin was a revision of the original 1935 version and was intended to eliminate any confusion about the use of analytical procedures. While the Bulletin
may have fallen short of that goal, it provided a number of interesting points.
For example, analytical procedures were regarded as "fundamental and indispensable" in audits involving an income statement "regardless of the existence or absence of internal control." Analytical procedures were intended
as a substantive test since they were an "effort to prove its substantial correctness as far as is practicable without systematic audit of the transactions."
Finally, in contrast to current professional standards, there is no mention of
inquiry of management as an important source of an explanation for an unexpected material difference.
Figure 1
Technical Procedures Manual
Haskins & Sells
(1939 edition)
Bulletin 302-1
ANALYTIC REVIEW OF OPERATING ACCOUNTS
This is written with a view to clearing up any misunderstanding there may beregardingthe reasons
for and procedure of reviewingthe accounts comprehended in and culminating in the net income or loss for a
period, and as to when such procedure should be applied.
In a general audit we go no farther in systematic auditing than to test the original records, so that
there is a considerable part of the period that is not covered by the systematic audit of transactions. It is
therefore necessary to supplement the audit tests byreviewof the transactions for the entire period. As a
matter of fact, it is more logical toregardthe systematic audit tests as superimposed upon the general
analytic review than toregardthe review as supplementing the audit tests. At all events, the analytic
review of operating accounts should be regarded as fundamental and indispensable, in any engagement where
the report is to include, and the certificate to cover, a statement of income and surplus--or any of its
variants--regardless of the existence or absence of internal control.
The procedure in making an analyticreviewof operating accounts can be outlined only generally.
It involves subjecting each detail operating, income, profit and loss, and surplus account torigidscrutiny,
and to some extent to detailed analysis, in an effort to prove its substantial correctness as far as practicable
without systematic audit of the transactions. Such review and analysis calls for the exercise of a high
degree of judgment and discrimination. Theremarksto follow should beregardedas only suggestive of the
general course to be followed, subject to such amplification and adaptation as may be necessary to meet the
peculiar needs of individual situations. It should be understood also that these remarks pertain only to the
analytic review and do not purport to cover all the work to be done on the operating accounts in a general
audit
Each operating account (using the term in its generic sense) as it appears in the ledger or other
record should be scrutinized in order to determine whether or not the entries have varied materially from
month to month during the year under review, and any material variation should be investigated. In some
cases, especially where businesses are seasonal, such monthly comparisons should be made with the
corresponding months of the preceding year or two. A detailed statement of the operating accounts should
be prepared for the year and for at least one preceding year (preferably two or three) in parallel columns, and
the respective items for the respective years should be compared. If there are divisions or branches of the
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business, the accounts for each should be considered separately and in relation to one another. All
significant ratios and averages should be computed for the purpose of making comparisons. The ratios
would include, for an industrial business, the ratio of returns, allowances, etc. to gross sales and the ratios
to net sale of cost of goods sold and of each item, or appropriate group of items, of selling, administrative,
and general expenses. For certain expenses such as purchasing andreceiving(if kept separate), the ratio of
purchases is a better standard of comparison than theratioto sales. Every material difference as indicated by
all these comparisons should be investigated to the point of determining, as nearly as practicable, that it is
proper or improper. The working papers should show all matters investigated and the results of the
investigations.
The cost of sales should be examined, and considered in relation to the sales, inventory, and
accounts payable. The account for cost of sales, and its principal tributary accounts, such as cost of
production, should be analyzed, as to essential features and important amounts, so that the composition of the accounts will be thoroughly understood. The method of determining charges for material,
labor, and overhead should be critically investigated. The gross-profit ratios for the current and preceding periods should be computed. The inventory turnover rate should be computed, if practicable
as to classes of goods (i.e., finished product, raw materials, etc.), for the current period and at least
one preceding period, by dividing the cost of goods sold or used by the average inventory. If there is
any indication that the cost does not bear the proper relationship to sales, or is otherwise incorrect,
the various elements entering into the cost should be examined as exhaustively as may be necessary
in order to determine the cause of the difference.
Among the other accounts which should be examined withrespectto operations from month to
month and period to period, and with respect to theirrelationto other accounts, such as sales or gross
earnings, or in some cases, assets or liabilities, specific mention may be made of the following:
Sales and wages
Income from interest and dividends
Interest expense
Taxes
Income or expense for rents,royalties, and commissions
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization
Repairs and maintenance
Direct charges and credits to surplus
It is thought that the foregoing explains the analytic review of operating accounts sufficiently so
that the underlying purpose of thereviewand the method of procedure will be understood, as applying not
only to the accounts that have been mentioned specifically, but also to any other operating, income, profit
or loss, and surplus accounts that may be encountered in practice.
December 1935 - Revised September 1939

We scanned the Accountant's Index and were unable to locate any specific
references to analytical review in the practice or scholarly literature prior to
1961. Mautz and Sharaf [1961] discuss what might be called analytical procedures including the terms "analytical and comparative review," "interrelationships" and "correlations" among "related data" [Mautz and Sharaf, 1961,
pp. 28, 86, 93, 100-101], According to Mautz, these ideas were not new but
reflected existing practices, at least at DH&S. Mautz was employed by DH&S
for a time during the 1940s and was later a consultant on an analytical review
project [private correspondence from Mautz, December 23, 1989].
Thefirst official recognition of analytical (review) procedures in professional standards appeared in November 1972 with the issuance of Statement
on Auditing Procedures No. 54 [AICPA, 1972]. This statement, entitled The
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Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control, established that the evidential matter required by the third standard could be met through "analytical review of significant ratios and trends and resulting investigation of
unusual fluctuations and questionable items" [para. 70]. Further, "Regardless of the extent of reliance on internal accounting control, the auditor's reliance on substantive tests may be derivedfrom tests of details, from analytical
review procedures, or from any combination of both that he considers appropriate in the circumstances" [para. 73]. This official guidance as to allowable
proportions of substantive evidence has remained unchanged over two major
revisions of analytical procedure guidance.
SAS No. 23 [AICPA, 1978], entitled Analytical Review Procedures, officially
established guidance on the identification and investigation of significant
"unusual fluctuations." It defined analytical procedures as "substantive tests
of financial information made by a study and comparison of relationships among
data" [para. 2]. SAS No. 56 [AICPA, 1988], entitled simply Analytical Procedures, provides a more precise definition as to what constitutes analytical procedures. Specifically, analytical procedures "consist of evaluations of financial
information made by a study of plausible relationships among both financial
and non-financial data." It continues the basic premise underlying the application of analytical procedures stated in SAS No. 23 that: "relationships
among data may reasonably be expected by the auditor to exist and continue
in the absence of known conditions to the contrary" [para. 2].
This basic premise is reasonable-if a prior relation observed, under conditions apparently free from material misstatement, continues in the audit period, then the current values are, probably, alsofree from material misstatement
The caveat "absence of known conditions to the contrary" provides for updating the auditor's model but doesn't establish a standard for how the auditor is to "know" about conditions to the contrary. Must the auditor search
for or test for changes in prior relations or just be aware of known or possible changes that are more or less obvious to the casual observer? Is positive,
rather than negative, assurance required for assessing possible changes?
SAS No. 56 focuses on unexpected differences (rather than fluctuations)
and is explicit as to the role of expectations. It states:
Analytical procedures involve comparisons of recorded amounts,
or ratios developedfrom recorded amounts, to expectations developed
by the auditor. The auditor develops such expectations by identifying
and using plausible relationships that are reasonably expected to exist
based on the auditor's understanding of the client and of the industry
in which the client operates [para. 5].
In identifying differences that may require analytical investigation, SAS
No. 56 [para. 11-12] lists three factors related to the diagnosticity of the procedures. These are: 1) the plausibility and predictability of the relations, 2)
the availability and reliability of data on which the expectations are developed,
and 3) the precision of the expectation.Thefirst suggests a causal model rather
than merely a "casual" association while the second requires that the auditor base expectations on data other than the recorded values themselves. Finally, the third makes it clear that the auditor should consider whether a

procedure couldfind an intolerably-in-error "needle" in a haystack [Kinney,
1987; Loebbecke and Steinbart, 1987].
As to investigation and evaluation of significant differences, SAS No. 56
allows a range of differences that can be accepted without further investigation and a range that should be investigated. In regard to investigation it states:
The auditor should evaluate significant unexpected differences. Reconsidering the methods and factors used in developing the expectation and inquiry of management may assist the auditor in this regard.
Management responses, however, should ordinarily be corroborated
with other evidential matter. In those cases when an explanation for
the difference cannot be obtained, the auditor should obtain sufficient
evidence about the assertion by performing other audit procedures
to satisfy himself as to whether the difference is a likely misstatement.
In designing such other procedures, the auditor should consider that
unexplained differences may indicate an increased risk of material misstatement [para. 21] (emphasis added).
This paragraph, especially the highlighted terms, provides much of the
basis for our concerns about the comparative competence of analytical procedures and their tendency to understate achieved risk. We will return to it
in the next section.
Passage of SAP No. 54 and SAS No. 23 was followed by practitioner and
scholarly discussion of the reliability of analytical review. For example, Montgomery's Auditing (9th ed.) [Defliese, Johnson, and Macleod 1975, p. 145] championed the use of analytical review over tests of details under conditions of
weak internal control while Cushing and Loebbecke [1983] took the opposite position. The latter view seems to have prevailed in that Montgomery's
Auditing (10th edition) [Defliese, Jaenicke, Sullivan, and Gnospelius 1987,
p. 341-42] discusses 100 percent reliance on analytical procedure results
when controls are strong.
Even though SAP No. 54, SAS No. 23 and SAS No. 56 did not indicate that
analytical evidence was in any way inferior to tests of details, there was such
an indication from practitioners. Ernst and Whinney placed restrictions on
the reliance that can be placed on analytical procedures [Grobstein and
Craig, 1984, p. 14]. Montgomery's Auditing stated that analytical procedures
produced a "subjective, deductive type of audit evidence" rather than the "objective type of evidence showing 'it is there or not there' which results from
the other auditing procedures" [Defliese et al., 1975, p. 145].1 The tenth edition of Montgomery's Auditing stated that, relative to analytical procedures,
tests of details are less efficient, but tests of details "commonly provide a higher
level of assurance with respect to an audit objective" [Defliese 1987, p. 340]
(emphasis added). Blocher and Willingham [1985] were even more explicit
about the relative assurance. They stated:
To evaluate the strength of the evidence from analytical review,
we must consider that analytical review provides a negative-type as1

The same source later defines evidence as "objective if it requires little judgment to evaluate
its accuracy" [Defliese et al. 1987, p. 158].
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surance rather than a positive one. That is, though analytical review
can be a useful technique for detecting a material misstatement, it cannot be relied upon to confirm with positive assurance that a misstatement is not present. Positive assurance comes only from the
proper application of the appropriate detail tests procedures. Thus, the
auditor can never rely exclusively on analytical review when risk or
materiality is high [p. 10]2 (emphasis added).
Two recent behavioral studies of practicing auditors are consistent with
this view. Both Biggs, et al. [1989] and Cohen and Kida [1989] found that auditors are reluctant to reduce tests of details even when analytical procedure
results seem to support a reduction.
The large CPA firms have different histories and different degrees of reliance on analytical procedures. As mentioned above, the first reference to
analytical procedures as evidence came from DH&S. SAP No. 54 was chaired
by Kenneth Stringer of DH&S and hisfirm was an early champion of statistical analytical procedures as substantive evidence. Stringer [1975], and
Stringer and Stewart [1986] described a system entitled Statistical Techniques for Analytical Review in Auditing. It used time series and cross sectional regression models to identify likely-to-be-in-error segments of an
account or transaction class. Stringer [1975] also discussed the importance
of the auditor's "analytical investigation" to determine the likely cause of a
deviation. Some otherfirms have also used regression analysis (e.g., Price
Waterhouse, [Akresh and Wallace, 1982, and Walker and Pierce, 1988] and
Arthur Andersen [Koster, 1981]).
Statistical analytical procedures have had less usage in mostfirms, even
including one (Peat Marwick) that is highly structured [Wright and Ashton,
1989, p. 722-723 and Elliott, 1984]. Also, analytical procedures of various
types are used for different purposes. For example, Ernst & Whinney uses
different analytical procedures for understanding the client's business, for inherent risk assessment and as substantive evidence [Grobstein and Craig,
1984]. Finally, in contrast to the DH&S regression-based approach to analyzing an account, Montgomery's Auditing (Coopers & Lybrand) seems to define the focus of analytical procedures to be on "ratio and trend analysis"
[Defliese, et al. 1987 p. 156] and is unclear about the extent to which the results provide substantive evidence.
Thus, a variety of analytical procedures have been used to meet various
objectives. Because of these differences, we will try to be very specific as to
procedures and their usage in the comparative competency assessment that
follows.

2

SAARS No. 1 [AICPA, 1978] and other AICPA-sanctioned review reports seem to provide at
least implicit support for this view. These reports are characterized as providing only "limited"
assurance that is expressed in negative form. The distinction is relevant since the review reports
are based on only analytical procedures and inquiry of management.
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2. Comparative Competency of Analytical Procedures
vs. Tests of Details
For the purpose of comparing reliability (or competency or validity) of
tests of details and analytical procedures results as substantive evidence, assume that audit sampling is used for tests of details, that a single account regression analysis is used to identify differences for analytical procedures, and
that both tests are for overstatement. Figure 2 shows the aggregate audited
account balance Y (say, sales) expressed as (1) the sum of N error free y's
or sales amounts per sales invoices, and as (2) a function of the true relation
between Y and an independently obtained explanatory variable X (say, industry
sales), and a random unexplained portion, e. 3
Figure 2
Example Upper Confidence Limit Formulations

Analytical Procedures 1)

Tests of Details

Actual (error free)
balance

Y=

Estimated Audited
balance

Y =α+ βX

Y= Ny

Estimated error

E = Yb - Y

E = Yb-Y

Upper Confidence Limit:

UCL = E + ZAPR se (pred)

UCL = E + ZTDRs/√ n

1) Y
y
y
X
E

α +βX+ e

Y = Σy

=
=
=
=
=

audited balance for the year t
audited balance of account or transaction class element in year t
average y for a random sample of n < N items
"causal" variable value for year t
error for year t
^=
Yb = recorded or "book" amount
APR = risk of incorrect acceptance using analytical procedures
TDR = risk of incorrect acceptance using tests of details

3

Although in practice there would likely be a partitioning of Y by plant, by product line or by
subperiod of time,we will use a single estimate for simplicity. Also, for simplicity we will assume
that simple random sampling is used and that a single causal variable X is considered in the auditor's model.
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Figure 2 also shows the estimate of Y (Y)given audited values of a randomly selected sample of n items and an independent estimate of Y given X
and the auditor's estimates of a andβ.Again, for the purpose of comparison,
imagine a case in which the two techniques yield the same point estimate of
error and that the standard error of the estimate in tests of details (s/√n) is
equal to the standard error of the regression prediction (se(pred)). Thus, the
two procedures yield the same upper confidence level (UCL) on error. If the
UCL is just under the minimum intolerable error (MIE), which procedure
do you think yields more reliable or more competent evidence?
Figures 3 (tests of details) and 4 (analytical procedures) show that each
of the procedures has two general failure points; that is, points at which the
auditor can be led incorrectly to accept a balance that is "intolerably" in
error. For tests of details (audit sampling), the points are: (1) the selection
of a sample which has smaller book values and/or contains proportionately
less error than what exists in the population as a whole (sampling error), and
(2) error in selecting or applying the auditing procedure such as selections
from recorded amounts to test the completeness assertion or failing to note
an error in a sampled item (non-sampling error). Thefirst risk can be measured within the limits of sampling error, and auditing standards assume that
the second can be made negligible by quality control procedures [SAS No.
39, para. 11 and SAS No. 47, para. 20].
For analytical procedures, the two points of potential failure are (1) the
identification, estimation and refinement of the expectations model, and (2)
the analytical investigation of differences from the resulting expectations. For
thefirst, the auditor may incorrectly specify the causal relations between independent variables and the account under audit, may misestimate the coefficients or the allowable range of deviation, or may fail to note changes in
the relations or may incorrectly revise the model based on management's suggested explanation. For the second, the auditor may incorrectly accept a nonerror explanation and revise the expectation sufficiently to yield UCL < MIE
when the account is intolerably overstated. Figure 5 presents a numerical example of how the second step can inflate the achieved audit risk. The first
stage is based on achieving a risk of incorrect acceptance of .05. In the example, the second stage adds .15 to that amount for an achieved audit risk
of .20 over a number of audits (see Kinney, [1989] for an elaboration of the
need for sequential analysis in auditing).
In the paragraphs to follow, we discuss a series of potential and likely biases that lead us to conclude that the application of analytical procedures is
likely to understate the risk of incorrect acceptance. The basic causes of the
biases are both statistical and behavioral, and are, in part, induced by professional standards themselves.
A fundamental competency advantage of tests of details is that for sampled items (and absent non-sampling error), misstatement is ruled out or conversely, "correctness" or validity of each recorded y is positively established.
The test can lead to incorrect acceptance only through sampling variation or
sampling error. For analytical procedures, the correctness of an item or
group of items is not positively established, by definition. Thus, a second in90

Figure 3
Risks of Failure Using Test of Details

Risk

Procedure

Randomly select
sample n items

Sampling error

Audit n items
selected
and estimate
UCL

UCL≤MIE
?

Nonsampling error

Y
A

Incorrect acceptance

N
R

Incorrect rejection

1) MIE = minimum intolerable error for the assertions being tested for overstatement
A = accept recorded value as not intolerably overstated.
R = reject recorded values as possibly intolerably overstated.
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Figure 4
Risks of Failure Using Analytical Procedures

Risk

Procedure

Identify (refine)
Model
identification /
estimation error

model and
estimate UCL

UCL ≤ MIE

Y

A

Incorrect acceptance

?

N

Conduct analytical
investigation

Y

Incorrect/incomplete
explanation

Revise
model
?

N
Incorrect rejection

R
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Y

N

R

7

Revise
model

Conduct analytical
investigation

N

UCL≤MIE
?

Identify (refine)
model and
estimate UCL

Y

92

A

Incorrect rejection

Incorrect/incomplete
explanation

Incorrect acceptance

Model
identification /
estimation error

Risk

1

First
Try

.875

.5

.5714

.25

.4286

.20 CR

.075 IR

.15 IA

.225 CA

.05 IA

.30 CA4

CA = correct acceptance
IR = incorrect rejection, etc.
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Based on the assumption that P(acceptistate) is proportional to the area between 0 and MIE.

2 Based on the assumption that:
MIE = 1.15 se(pred) and
Decision rule is to accept if E< 0

3

Second
Try

.75

3

1
Assessed prior probability that E = 0 is .6
Assessed prior probability that E = MIE is .4.

.4

.6

2

.125

.5

Example Calculation
of Achieved
Analytical Procedure Risk

Risks of Failure Using Analytical Procedures

Procedure

Figure 5

Figure 4

ference is always required for analytical procedures. Specifically, if the unexplained differences are small, then intolerable error in the overall account
balance is inferred to be negligible.
Statistical Biases
At the model identification, estimation and refinement stage, the auditor
is developing a basis for expected audited values. The auditor faces several
risks that increase the variance of outcomes and some that bias results toward incorrect acceptance. They relate to the model used and the data to which
it is applied. Many of these difficulties are well known.
First, the auditor may fail to include variables that are causal. This risk
can be reduced by auditor expertise in the client's industry. The auditor may
also include Xs that are not causally related to Y. Here, the risk is over-identifying the model or including variables that are spuriously correlated with
Y in the base period but are uncorrelated in the prediction period. Thus, variables which by chance have high correlation in the base period are inappropriately included for the prediction period. Finally, the auditor may fail to
notice that the parameters of included variables have changed between the
base and the prediction periods.
While these phenomena may lead to incorrect acceptance, they may also
lead to incorrect rejection. There is no reason to expect a statistical bias. However, as described in the next subsection, the analytical investigation stage
of the process can lead to a model building bias toward incorrect acceptance.
Specifically, the identification of an unexpected difference can lead the auditor to search in a biased fashion for omitted non-error causal variables. That
is, the auditor's search for omitted variables is caused by the identification
of an unacceptable difference (UCL ≥ MIE) and the ensuing search for an
explanation naturally leads to a higher probability of including a non-error cause
that reduces the UCL. For example, suppose that the audit year cost of sales
contains an unexpected increase in labor costs of $10, an unexpected decrease
in materials cost of $10 and an inventory counting error of $10 that understates the expense. As a result, cost of sales is $10 less than expected and
the auditor searching for an explanation would be more likely to detect the
decrease in materials cost than to detect the increase in labor cost or the accounting error. 4 Thus, the biased search for an omitted causal explanation
can lead to failure to detect misstatements.
Second, erroneous or irrelevant data also have both positive and negative aspects with respect to incorrect acceptance of accounts with intolerable total error. Bad data in the base period may prevent reliance on statistical
analytical procedures. For example, random measurement error in the X variable for the base period will lead to estimates of βbiased toward zero, and
an inflation of the standard error of the regression (se) will cause the auditor not to rely on regression since the UCL will tend to be high. Thus, ran4

SAS No. 56 [para. 18] warns that "offsetting factors may obscure misstatements," e.g., an unexpected nonerror understatement could hide an error-caused overstatement Yet the auditor
trying to explain a UCL ≥MIE would have no reason to look for a non-error factor that would
increase the UCL!
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dom measurement error in the base period X values leads to an incorrect
rejection or efficiency bias. Nonrandom measurement error leads to less predictable results. However, since the base period has been audited, there is
reduced risk of bad data in the base period. The potential problem of intentionally misstated X data for the prediction period is one reason that Cushing and Loebbecke [1983] argued for strong internal controls as a requisite
for reliance on analytical tests.
We have labeled this subsection "statistical" biases. However, the risks
and biases apply to a non-statistically-based procedure as well as to statistically-based procedures. Subjectively or judgmentally failing to consider an
important causal variable can bias one's judgment about the results to be expected. Also, a lack of quantification of estimates may lead to unrealistic assessments of effects and to systematic underestimates of the normal variation
in expected values [Tversky and Kahneman, 1971]. The latter behavioral tendency will cause the UCL to be too low and lead to increased risk of incorrect acceptance. This inability to signal or "flag" intolerable (or even material)
misstatements seems to be especially probable when considering ratios
based on aggregate values.5
Behavioral Biases
At the stage of evaluating analytical procedure results, SAS No. 56 suggests several practices that are almost sure to lead to an increase in the risk
of incorrect acceptance. For accounts for which the UCL equals or exceeds
MIE, paragraph 21 of SAS No. 56 (reproduced earlier) provides guidance for
follow-up. Specifically, it listsfive ways in which the process is biased toward
incorrect acceptance when an unexpected difference is noted. Rather than
considering possible misstatement, thefirst suggestion in paragraph 21 is that
A
the auditor "reconsider" the model used to develop the expectation (Y) and,
second, it indicates that "inquiry of management" may assist in this regard
(is management likely to suggestfraud or error as the cause?). Third, as to
corroborating management's suggested explanations, paragraph 21 states that
they "should ordinarily be" corroborated (but not always?). Fourth, apparently only in those cases in which "an explanation for the difference cannot
be obtained" the auditor should apply other procedures to rule out misstatement. Finally, in designing other procedures, the auditor should consider
that "unexplained differences may indicate an increased risk of material misstatement." It seems clear that the risk of such misstatement is increased if,
indeed, no non-misstatement explanation can be found for the difference. That
is, if all other factors have been ruled out, then all that is left is chance or misstatement. Thus, paragraph 21 of SAS No. 56 focuses attention on non-error
causes that may bias the auditor toward incorrect acceptance.
In addition to the possible bias due to the official guidance, the psychology literature has identified several biases that decision makers often exhibit
when making probabilistic judgments. Auditing is characterized by complex
probabilistic judgments and much of behavioral auditing research has focused
5

For further caveats about the problem of weak diagnosticity, see Grobstein and Craig [1984,
p. 14], Loebbecke and Steinbart [1987] and Kinney [1987].
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on auditors' biases in making such judgments. The research discussed below
is a sample of the studies indicating possible behavioral biases that may result in an understatement of achieved audit risk through the application of
analytical procedures as substantive tests. The biases are grouped according to whether they apply during the audit in determining a possible explanation of an unexpected difference (hypothesis generation), or in revising
assessed probabilities of possible causes, or after the audit is completed and
results are evaluated by others.
Hypothesis Generation
The availability bias refers to the tendency of a decision maker to judge
thefrequency of an event by the ease with which similar events come to mind
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1973]. Events may be salient because they are
sensational or vivid or because they have been experienced frequently. Libby
[1985] asked auditors to hypothesize up to six errors that might explain unusual analytical review results and to rate the likelihood that each error
caused the fluctuation. Results indicated that the likelihood of each error was
affected by its perceivedfrequency, its actualfrequency and the recency with
which the error had been encountered by the auditors. These results for error
causes are disturbing if analytical review is to be used as substantive evidence.
We know of no archival data on non-error explanations of unexpected differences. However, if the auditor has frequently or recently encountered
non-error causes when evaluating significant fluctuations in other clients' financial statements, he or she may be too easily persuaded that a currently
observed fluctuation is also due to a non-error cause. As a result, achieved
audit risk may be understated.
Output interference occurs when knowledge already retrieved from memory hinders the retrieval of additional items (see Nickerson [1984]). Frederick [1988] found experienced auditors to be affected by output interference.
Auditors studied lists of internal controls and then were asked to recall the
controls. Half of the auditors were presented with a partial list of previously
learned internal controls; the other half received no cues. Auditors without
the cues recalled more controls on the recall task than did those provided
with the partial list.
Output interference may cause auditors to misdiagnose significant fluctuations in analytical review results. If the auditor asks client management
to explain a deviation, the non-error reasons provided may interfere with retrieval of the auditor's own knowledge of possible error causes. If the auditor relies on his or her own experience, output interference combined with
the availability heuristic may cause the auditor to focus on the causes most
accessible in memory to the exclusion of an important error cause.6
Heiman [1990] studied auditors' spontaneous generation of explanations
for unexpected differences. She found that auditors did not spontaneously
generate as many alternative explanations for ratio fluctuations as they did
6
Hock [1984] and Moser [1989] link output interference with availability to provide a mechanism by which judgments are biased.

96

when prompted to do so. Failure to generate or consider counter-explanations,
together with belief perseverance (see next subsection) may cause the auditor to accept a non-error cause of analytical review deviations despite evidence to the contrary. If auditors receivefrom management a non-error cause
for an unexpected difference and don't spontaneously generate possible
error causes, the chances of incorrect acceptance are increased.
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic represents the decision maker's
tendency to focus on an initial value (an anchor) and to subsequently update
(adjust) inadequately the initial belief as new information is received. Behavioral
research has shown that anchoring and adjustment can result in a judgmental bias since decision makers may rely on an irrelevant initial anchor,
or may make insufficient adjustments with respect to the informativeness of
the new data [Libby, 1981, pp. 162-163]. Kinney and Uecker [1982] reported
results consistent with anchoring in an attention directing analytical review
task. Auditors tended to anchor on book value to develop point estimates beyond which an analytical investigation of the book value was appropriate. Biggs
and Wild [1985], and Heintz and White [1989] obtained similar results in extensions. This bias applies only to non-statistical procedures but is disturbing since it violates independence of expectations and book values.
Probability Revision
Revision of initially formed probability or risk assessments may also be
biased. In some situations, decision makers may continue belief in an initial
hypothesis even in light of subsequently received evidence to the contrary.
That is, the initial belief "perseveres." Koonce [1990] investigated auditors'
tendency to focus on initial beliefs in an analytical review setting and found
results consistent with belief perseverance. Specifically, Koonce's results indicated that auditors who developed written non-error explanations for unusual analytical review results continued to accept the explanation as the most
likely unless explicitly requested to develop counter-explanations.
After forming an initial hypothesis in a judgment task, decision makers
often search for and place more importance on evidence that confirms the
hypothesis than on disconfirming evidence [Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983;
Klayman and Ha, 1987]. This "confirmation bias" is found in a variety of settings including complex problem-solving and probabilistic-judgment tasks similar to those found in auditing (e.g., Wason [1960], Wason and Johnson-Laird
[1972] and Snyder and Swann [1978]). When auditing a reputable client, the
auditor may have a strong initial belief that no material misstatements are
present in thefinancial statements. Mautz and Sharaf [1961, p. 28] indicate
that the idea of an initial hypothesis of no error is one of long standing. If errors or irregularities do exist, however, a confirmation bias may influence the
auditor's assessment of subsequent evidence and counter-evidence and
achieved audit risk may be higher than planned.
While confirmation bias is potentially important in evaluating analytical
procedure results, behavioral research in auditing has found only mixed support for it. When evaluating a going-concern issue, Kida [1984] found that,
in general, auditors place more importance on the factors indicating possi97

ble failure than on the factors indicating viability. Trotman and Sng [1989]
extended Kida [1984] with essentially the same results in an internal control
task. Ashton and Ashton [1988] found that auditors were influenced more
by disconfirming evidence than by confirming evidence in an internal control task. Butt and Campbell [1989] also tested for confirmation bias in an internal control task and found that auditors did not seek confirming evidence
unless specifically requested to do so. In a study of analytical procedures, the
Biggs, Mock, and Watkins [1989] protocol analyses of four audit managers
and seniors in an analytical review task suggested that, while the two managers were careful to guard against confirmation bias, the two audit seniors
were less likely to do so. The authors concluded that experience might affect the auditor's ability to appropriately analyze analytical review results. However, Bonner's [1990] results indicate that experience differences play an
important role in analytical review cue selection and weighting but are not
important in evaluating internal control risk. This suggests that task-specific
knowledge may mitigate confirmation bias.
According to Bayes' rule, the order in which information is presented should
not affect the decision maker's belief revision process. However, the psychological literature has documented situations in which the order of evidence
presentation affects revised beliefs. Hogarth and Einhorn [1989] have developed a belief-adjustment model that can explain primacy, recency or no
order effects depending on complexity, length of the evidence series, and response mode. Ashton and Ashton [1988] used the Hogarth and Einhorn
[1989] model and successfully predicted recency effects in auditors' internal
control evaluations. Butt and Campbell [1989] also found support for the belief-adjustment model when auditors held weak initial beliefs about internal
control reliability. With the exception of Koonce [1990], we are not aware of
any studies of possible order effects in use of analytical procedures. However,
order may be important, especially in light of the fact that the auditor may
stop the investigation before contrary evidence is received or may resist consideration of subsequently received evidence to the contrary.
Post Audit Analysis
Decisions should be evaluated in light of the information available at the
time the decision was made regardless of the ultimate outcome. Hindsight
bias refers to the inability to evaluate past decisions without considering currently available information [Fischhoff, 1975]. While hindsight bias has not
been studied in an auditing context [Ashton et al., 1988], the bias is particularly detrimental if analytical review procedures are used as substantive evidence since decisions are based on limited, aggregated information. If, after
the auditor's report is issued, subsequent information reveals material misstatement and the auditor's work is challenged, the courts may determine
that the auditor should have recognized the potential for misstatement using
properly applied analytical procedures. The auditor should consider the potential effects of hindsight bias before choosing to rely on analytical procedures as substantive evidence. That is, ask, "How will others judge the
credibility of my evidence if, indeed, material misstatement exists?" Thus, in
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addition to consideration of his or her own biases, the auditor may need to
consider biases of others who will have additional information. 7

3. Concluding Remarks
In the paragraphs above, we have outlined the history and several potential
limitations of the reliability of analytical procedure results used as substantive evidence. In contrast to substantive tests of details, wefind that analytical procedure results are subject to several biases that may overstate their
apparent competence.
With proper selection and application of audit procedures, tests of details
will fail to detect extant intolerable error only if the auditor is unlucky—that
is, only if the sample is not representative of the population. For analytical
procedures, the auditor may fail due to chance fluctuations in the data. However, analytical procedures may also fail to detect error due to biases related
to the way in which auditor's research question is posed—trying to determine
that the recorded data might be right rather than trying to see whether it is
wrong.
What, if anything, can be or should be done? We have some suggestions
for researchers and for standards setters.
Researchers
There are several promising areas for further research into the reliability or competency of analytical procedures. There is need for analytical work
as well as for statistical and behavioral studies. Our list is based on the
thoughts expressed above and should not be interpreted as comprehensive
for the entire area of analytical procedures.
From an analytical perspective, what is the essential mathematical nature
of analytical procedures with respect to error and how they should be combined in revising prior probabilities of error? Is Bayes' Rule adequate? How
does the second inference required for analytical procedures affect probability
revision? How should the second order probability by accommodated?8
How reliable are the analytical procedures used in practice? How does
their reliability differ across procedures or across accounts or across levels
of expertise? What is their achieved risk? Statements that X percent of all errors detected by auditors were detected by analytical procedures (e.g., see
Wright and Ashton [1989]), are one sided. The statement is not reversible
into a positive statement that absence of an indication of misstatement means
an absence of material error—the auditor may have been a victim of bias or
simply may not have looked hard enough.
On the behavioral side, to what extent do the biases discussed above apply
and how much do they affect achieved reliability of analytical procedures?
Are auditors unduly influenced by management's suggestions of non-mis7

Felix and Waller [1984] refer to the probability of evidence being judged adequate as a "second order" probability.
8

See footnote 7.
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statement explanations of unexpected differences? Or, do auditors systematically discount the results of analytical procedures as Biggs, et al. [1989]
and Cohen and Kida [1989] suggest? Is the discounting a recognition of some
of the inherent limitations of analytic procedure results as evidence?
Standards Setters
As indicated above, SAS No. 56 is a considerable improvement in guidance to practitioners. It provides at least a partial conceptual basis for analytical procedures and many warnings of dangers in the application of analytical
procedures. However, there is one rather simple modification to its guidance
that could lead to substantive reduction in the biases discussed above.
The suggestion is to change the focus of SAS No. 56 paragraph 21 from
a search for non-misstatement causes to a consideration of misstatement
causes. Figure 6 presents possible wording. The suggestion is similar to the
"conceptually logical approach" of SAP No. 54 [para. 65] to "consider the types
of errors and irregularities that could occur" and then to consider which controls would prevent them. For analytical procedures, the approach would be
to consider possible misstatements and then look for data that would be consistent with the misstatement.
Figure 6
Suggested Revision to SAS No. 561
.21 The auditor should evaluate significant unexpected differences and
evaluate possible misstatements as the cause. For example, an
unusual difference between recorded and expected cost of sales
might be due to omitted credit purchases or a pricing error in
the ending inventory. Consideration of related payables and
inventory balances may help resolve the matter.
After
considering possible misstatement, inquiry of management may assist
the auditor in revising the auditor's expectation.
Management
responses, however, should ordinarily be corroborated with other
evidential matter.
.21a In those cases when an explanation for the difference cannot be
obtained, the auditor should obtain sufficient evidence about the assertion
by performing other audit procedures to satisfy himself as to whether the
difference is a likely misstatement.3 In deciding such other procedures, the
auditor should consider that unexplained differences may indicate an
increased risk of material misstatement.

1

Additions are in bold and deletions in the original are lined.
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Given an unexpected difference, the auditor would consider what error
cause might explain it. Then the auditor would consider what other readily
available data would be consistent with the error and determine whether the
other data is consistent. For example, when recorded cost of sales is unexpectedly low, the auditor might hypothesize that it could be due to omitted
credit purchases and then look to see whether ending payables are also
lower than expected. Alternatively, he or she might consider possible overpricing of the ending inventory and look for unexpectedly high ending inventory. Note that if the auditor simply asks management (as SAS No. 56
discusses), management might suggest improved inventory planning and control or improved purchasing procedures as the explanation. The auditor
might search for andfind some evidence of such improvements and incorrectly attribute too large a dollar effect to the improvement and stop his or
her search for error.
It seems to us that auditing standards should be designed to help reduce
biases to which the auditor may fall victim—especially those that lead to incorrect acceptance. We believe that a change in the focus of paragraph 21 of
SAS No. 56 could help.
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